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LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE 
My subject tonight is the street demonstration -
a relatively new phenomenon on the American scene. It has 
become a symbol of the civil rights movement, and therefore 
has been widely acclaimed across the land. Indeed, it has 
been quite fashionable to march in demonstrations - especially 
when television cameras provide a national audience. 
But my concern this evening is not with the 
nature or justness of the causes, nor with the motives of 
those who march . We meet here tonight as lawyers , and I 
have chosen this subject because it relates to the first 
responsibility of our profession - the preservation of law 
and order. It is also a subject in which exploding develop -
ments have outdistanced the legal response - by public 
officials, the courts and the legislatures. 
Each of us no doubt has his own mental image of 
a street demonstration. Depending perhaps upon one's 
prejudices (whether articulated or not), the image ranges 
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from that of a few dozen earnest citizens marching dis-
creetly to the city hall to the savage street mobs shouting 
"Burn, Baby, Burn" in Watts, California. 
The truth is that the spectrum of what might 
fairly be called a demonstration is very broad indeed. 
But the typical street demonstration is usually a 
c ivic disorder in fac t , wha t ever it may be in law . For= 
tunately, marchers in many c ivil rights demonstrations 
have been well disciplined , elaborately escorted by police 
and therefore essentially orderly. But t here have been far 
more actual disorders than many suppose , both by the marchers 
and by those incensed by the demonstrations. And the threat 
of serious violence is ever present. 
Even the non- violent demonstrations f r equent ly 
exac t a high price from the public. They engender fear and 
uneasiness , disrupt traffic , create discordant noises , litter 
the streets, and - most important of all - deny free and 
normal use of the streets and sidewalks to ot her citizens. 
The typical demonstration also imposes a heavy 
responsibility upon police , and encourages c rime in areas 
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left unprotected while police accompany marchers. More= 
over, demonstrations are burdensome to the ·public treasury. 
The famous five-day Selma to Montgomery march required the 
protection of the National Guard, blocked the normal flow 
of traffic, and cost the taxpayers some $500,000. * 
Most lawyers would agree, I think, that the pay-
ment of some price~ in terms of taxpayers ~ f unds and in= 
convenience to citizens = is justified to allow reasonable 
exercis e of cherished First Amendment rights. But the rights 
of other citizens must also be protected , and the general 
public order must always be the overriding consideration. 
The problem - and a very difficult one indeed where 
multitudes take to the streets and are told that only just 
laws need be obeyed - is to strike a balance which preserves 
the liberties of all. In my view , there is mounting evidence 
of serious imbalanceo The use of coercive demonstrations, 
rather than lawful democratic processes , is already a 
problem of serious dimensions . 
*Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law , 51 Va o L. Rev. 
785 , 788 (1965) 0 
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The first question which lawyers must ask is 
whether public authorities are powerless under the law to 
~ ,,.-,..e. ~ ,,,,,,...e~ nv 
~ .-1Clemonstrations. The street demonstration is closely 
associated with the doc t rine of civil disobedience . Indeed, 
the s i t= in and the demons tration are the s t andard t echniques 
of c i v il disobedience. 
This specious doc t rine , as the result of skillful 
propaganda and much respectable sponsorship , has at t ained 
an a l most untouchable status in the mysti c ism of our t ime. 
Pe r haps because of t his , as well as t oleration by timid 
poli t i c ians , there is a widespread belief that the street 
demons t ration cannot be •eon~ regulat ed and t hat 
the on l y r emedy is t o muster enough p olicemen and t r oops to 
foresta l l rio t ing . 
I t seems to me t ha t those who entert ain this 
defeatis t attitude have no t read the deci s i ons of the 
Supreme Court . I t is t r ue that many cases have been dec ided 
i n f avor of sit - ins and demonstrators. But ea ch of these 
cases has t u r ned on i t s fac ts, and in each a major ity of 
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the Court has found discrimination - either in the context 
of the law or ordinance or in its application. Although 
reasonable minds could differ (and in fact did differ 
sharply) as to the facts in some of these cases, I incl ine 
to the view that most of them were correctly decided. 
But the important point is that no new principles 
have evolved. There may have been refinement and clarifica-
tion, but the basic principles applied in recent demonstra-
tion cases are those which the Court has consistently 
enunciated over a period of many years. * 
*See for example Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43 (1897) 
(Boston ordinance limiting use of public grounds for public 
speeches sustained); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 495 (1939) (city 
ordinance prohibiting public assemblies without a permit held 
invalid as going too far in suppressing free speech and 
assembly); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (convic-
tion of Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly conduct in holding 
a rel igious meeting without a permit was reversed~ where 
ordinance contained no standards); Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S . 1 (1948) (no "clear and present danger" of breach 
of peace found); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (a 
contrary result was reached where such danger was found to 
exist); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (conviction 
of Jehovahvs Witnesses for parading without a permit affirmed); 
and Poulos~. v. New Hampshire , 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (an 
ordinance requiring permit for public assembly held to have 
been arbitrarily applied). 
60 
Although this is neither the time nor place to 
review court decisions, it may be helpful to mention the 
companion decisions in Cox v. Louisiana, decided in 1965. 
The case of Edwards Vo South Carolina*, decided two years 
earlier, was the first major decision involving demonstra-
tion tactics of the current civil rights movement. But the 
opinions in the two Cox cases contain the bes t summaries of 
the guiding principles. 
You will remember the facts. Some two thousand 
Negro college students , protesting the arrest and trial 
of fellow students on picketing charges , assembled in Baton 
Rouge, marched two and one~half blocks to the courthouse , 
and demonstrated across the street - some 125 feet = from 
the courthouse during t he trialo 
Cox , the leader, was arrested and charged with 
various offenses , including violation of a "br each of the 
372 U.S. 229 (1963)0 
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peace" statute.* A majority of the Court, in reversing the 
conviction, held that in fact there was no breach of the 
peace, and also that the statute itself was "unconsti-
tutionally broad in scope." For both of these reasons, the 
Court concluded that Louisiana had "infringed appellantvs 
rights of free speech and free assembly." 
In the companion case, arising out of the same 
facts, Cox had been convicted under another Louisiana statute 
prohibiting picketing or parading at or near courthouses. 
Although this was deemed to be a valid statute, Cox~s con-
viction was again reversed by five of the Justices on an 
entrapment theory, a policeman having advised the group it 
could assemble at this place. 
,'(The Louisiana statute provided: "Whoever with intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such 
that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby •.• 
crowds or congregates with others .•• in or upon •.• 
a public street or public highway, or upon a public side~ 
walk, or any other public place or building ••• and who 
fails or refuses to disperse and move on ••• when ordered 
so to do by any law enforcement officer ••• shall be 
guilty of disturbing the peace." See 379 U.S. at 544. 
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Although Mr. Justice Goldberg had spoken for the 
majority in both cases, he was careful to say: 
"Nothing we have said here .•• is to 
be interpreted as sanctioning • • . demonstra~ 
tions, however peaceful their conduct or 
commendable their motives , which conflict 
with properly drawn statutes and ordinances 
designed to promote law and order, protect 
the community agains t disorder , regulate 
traffic , safeguard legitimate interests in 
private and public property, or protect the 
ad.ministration of justice and other essential 
governmental functions ...• [T]he right of 
peaceful protest does not mean that everyone 
with opinions or beliefs to express may do so 
at any time and at any place. There is a 
proper time and place for even the mos t peace~ 
ful protest and a plain duty and responsibility 
on the part of all c itizens to obey all valid 
laws and regulations."-,\-
In light of Cox and the long line of cases which 
preceded it , the following generalizations seem justified: 
1. The First Amendment rights (free speech, free 
as sembly and right to peti t ion) apply to demonstrations , 
just as they do to parades and picketing. 
2. The right to communicate ideas by conduct 
(i.e. demonstrations , marches and picketing) is not absolute 
*379 U. S. at 594. 
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andj indeed, is not as broad as the right to 11communicate 
ideas by pure speech." 
3. States and localities have a duty to pre-
serve the peace, and where there is a "clear and present 
danger" of disorder demonstrations may be inhibited , and 
continued participation therein may be valid grounds fo r 
conviction. 
4. States and localities have a duty to regulate 
traffic and to safeguard normal public use of the streets. 
There can be no question, t herefore, as to the validity 
of properly drawn laws specifying "the time, place ~ dura-
t i on or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies. 11 
The discretion vested in the administrative officials must 
be careful ly defined , and exercised uniformly and without 
discrimination. * 
5. It is probable that a state or locality could 
validly forbid , on a non- discriminatory basis , "all access 
*Cox v. Louisiana, supra , at 558; see also Cox v. New 
Hampshire, supra, at 576. 
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to streets and other public facilities" for demonstrations. Such 
an absolute ban would be less vulnerable to attack if confined to 
certain streets or if applicable only at certain times, and if 
other public areas were available for assemblies of people. * 
6. It is not clear whether a state or locality may 
forbid any march or demonstration without a ·prior written per-
mit. This would be an invalid restraint if the grant ing of a 
permit lay in the unbridled discreti on of the local officials. 
It would probably be valid if explicit and reasonable standards 
were prescribed and uniformly enforced.** 
i'**** 
Now, with these princ iples in mind= which out~ 
line the inherent power of local government to control 
*See dictum of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Cox v. Louisiana , supra , 
a t 555; see opinion of Mr. J ustice Black, Cox v . Louisiana , 
supra , at 577; see concurring opinion of Mr. Just i ce Frank~ 
furter, Niemotko v . Maryland , supra, at 282~83 ; see als o Kovacs 
v . Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 , 98. There is some indication in the 
opinions t hat the state is under no obligat ion "to supply a 
place fo r people to exercise freedom of speech or as sembly", 
suggesting that all stree ts could be placed off limits for 
demonstra t i ons. 
**See Cox v. New Hampshire , supra, and Poulos v. New Hampshire, 
supra . The Supreme Court recently agreed to review an Alabama 
state court decision holding Dr. King and others in contempt for 
ignoring a court injunction against their demonstrating without 
a permit. 35 U.S.L. Week 3109 (U.S., Oct. 11 , 1966). 
demonstrations - it may be of interest to consider what 
actually happened in Chicago last summer. 
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As early as the summer of 1965 that city experienced 
a series of "non-violent" eruptions - numbering nearly 100 
separate demonstrations.* But these were merely the prelude. 
In the spring of 1966, Dr. King announced a new campaign 
"to remove the gargantuan structures of injustice" in 
Chicago.** He warned: 
*These were directed against the Democratic Mayor and the 
Board of Education. The objective was t o "get" the Super-
intendent of Schools for his reluctance to expand the 
busing of pupils and the dismantling of the neighborhood 
school system. Groups of demonstrators, purporting to be 
practicing civil disobedience, lay down in the stree ts 
during the rush hours, blocking traffic and causing extreme 
inconvenience to the public generally. More than 800 people 
were arrested during the summer. 
i.:-~~Martin Luther King l) Addres s at Chicago Freedom Festival, 
t he Ampitheatre , March 12 , 1966 (References are to the 
mineographed t ext of this address as released to the press). 
I t may surprise many - especially in the North - to have 
Dr . King also say: "While the South burst forth with the 
dynamic vibrancy of a new democracy, the Negro in the North 
found himself increasingly pressed down by the cruel weight 
of vicious and discriminatory forces." 
" .•. We will encourage sit-ins, stand-
ins, rent strikes, boycotts, picket lines , 
marches, civil disobedience and any form 
of protest and demonstrations that are 
nonviolently conceived and executed."* 
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This was no idle threat. Chicago, during the mid~surnmer of 
1966, was racked by massive civil disobedience - the full 
extent of which is still generally unknown across our 
country. 
Public officials , proud of their city ' s record 
of non~dis c riminatory laws and genuine concern for minority 
r ights , were stunned and incapable of decisive ac tion. 
f/undreds of carefully planned and coordinated demonstrations 
disrup t ed~~ ci~JAt~-~ormal life and provoked disord~r and 
- ~ ~ ~Wrt,¢- 1,4-o ~flu ~-d-t/Yk:2-, 
v i olence,4 Jhe basic reaction was to rush police r einforce-
ments f r om disor der to disorder - much like fireman dealing 
wi t h planned arson. 
But finally an outraged , but exes s i vely timid ~ 
Mayor ac ted. On August 10 , 1966 , the city filed suit in 
t he Circuit Court of Cook County against Dr. King , seven 
*King , Address in Chicago Ampitheatre , March 12 , 1966 , 
p . 8. 
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other individuals (including four other ministers of the 
Gospel) , and three organizations, including the Southern 
Chr istian Leadership Conference. 
Only a desperate situation would have prompted a 
politically sensitive mayor , in a city with a controlling 
rac ial vote , to invoke the law against the living legend 
of the civil rights movement. 
But the situation was desperate. If the detailed 
Complaint of t he Ci t y , sworn to by Orlando W. Wilson, 
Superintendent of Polic e , is accurate , it is a frightening 
description of what happened in the name of "peaceful 
demonstrations" , led by an organization calling itself 
"Chris t ian" o* There is not time this evening to read the 
a l l e gat i ons of fact. 
For present purposes , it will suffice if I 
sunnnarize briefly t he condi t ions averred ~ 
* Chi cago v. Mar tin Lut her King , et al, Ciro Ct o of Cook 
County , Complaint fi l ed Aug o 19 , 1966, sworn to on behalf 
of t he Ci t y by Raymond F . Simon , Corporation Counsel, and 
Orlando Wo Wils on, Supt. of Polic e o On the same day , the 
court entered a preliminary injunction against the defend-
ant s. Thr oughout the Complaint , the averments are made in 
t erms of "one or more or all of the defendants 11 o I n the 
i nte res t of br evi t y , I wi l l r efer to them merely as "the 
defendants". 
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The defendants started their planning many months 
in advance; they announced a massive program to develop 
"creative tension" in Chicago, th~ being to force 
open housing in fact as well as in law. 
There were more than 200 separate demonstrations 
organized and led by defendants. In some ins t anc es , parade 
permi t s were obtained; in other instances , the demonstra t ions 
,:,.thJt-_ 
were conducted without permitso "On only two occasions " ~ 
t he po l ice department notified in advance of the "loca t ion , 
char a cter and extent " of t he planned demonstra t i on . This 
failu r e t o give adequat e wri t ten no t i c e occurre d in s pit e of 
" repeat ed requests" by the Chicago aut hor ities, and des pit e 
p romises by t he defendants to provide such not i c e o 
The defendant s frequently conducted mul t i ple 
demonstra t i ons i n diffe rent areas a t t he same t ime, or wi th 
ove rlapping t ime s , t hereby c ont ribut i n g to the s train on 
police forces and the diffic ul t y of maintain i ng l aw a nd ordero 
These demonstrat i ons overwhelmed t he p ol ice of 
Chic ago , requiring at times the removal of hundreds o f 
p olic emen "fr om t heir normal duty posts" . This r educti on 
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of police protection "resulted in a substantial increase 
in the crime rate during the periods of the demonstrations". 
The Complaint described some of the conditions 
~~· 
e+elt exist~ as follows~ 
"Access to the sidewalks was denied to 
non=participating citizens, the normal flow 
of traffic, both pedestrian and vehicular, 
was obstructed, substantial damage was done 
to private property , and hundreds of persons 
were arrested." 
Most of the serious disorders resulted when crowds 
of angry persons reacted against the demonstrators , a 
s ituation requiring massive police protection= the pro= 
viding of which was hampered by the absence of notice and 
the technique of multiple and simultaneous demonstrations. 
There were, as you know, serious riots in Chicago 
during the period in question, requiring employment of 
the National Guard. The Complaint does not expressly charge 
defendants with any responsibility for these r iots. But 
i f is evident that the Chicago authorities considered the 
conduct of the defendants to have been a relevant factor. 
The City ws Complaint averred as follows ~ 
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"During the months of June and July, 
1966, in several areas of the City of Chicago, 
where one or more or all of the defendants 
and others were actively engaged in organizing 
the people of specific corrnnunities, namely, the 
Near West Side, Wabash, Lawndale, Englewood and 
Woodlawn, to protest against alleged violation 
of their civil rights, and during a period of 
time when one or more or all of the defendants 
and others were making statements, issuing news 
releases, appearing on other communications---media 
and publicly corresponding with public officials 
for the furtherance of their announced plan of 
"crea t ive tension", major civil disturbances 
erupted in the aforesaid areas of the City 
resulting in damages in excess of · several million 
dollars to private property, the death of 27 per-
sons and injury to 374 persons :, including 61 
pol ice officers." 
The Complaint concludes with averments that the 
defendants "threatened. : . to expand the demonstra-
tions into many other neighborhoods at simultaneous times"; 
that it would be imposs ible f or the police to protect the· 
public; and t hat the demonstrations "constitute a clear 
and present danger to the order, peace and quiet , health, 
safety, morals and welfare of the City of Chicago." 
17. 
In briefest summary, this was the situation in 
Chicago described by City officials in their Comp l aint. 
The Court issued a preliminary injunction 
restraining the defendants from "conducting , organizing or 
participating in unreasonable demonstrations' ', spec ifying 
the following conditions: Demonstrations must be limited 
to "one specific area" on any given date , and to not more 
than 500 persons; they must be confined to daylight hours 
and "at times other than peak traffic periods", and may be 
c onducted only after '1n.ot less than 24 hours prior written 
notice to the police department . " 
Predictably, Dr . King denounced the injunction 
as "unconstitutional", reserved his right of civil dis -
obedience to disobey it, and proclaimed "we a r e prepared 
to put thousands in the street if need be" . ..,,_ 
A confrontation in the streets between King ' s 
"thousands" and the Chicago police was fortunately averted. 
* See U. S . News & World Report , Aug . 29, 1966 , p . 10 . 
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A settlement of civil rights demands was worked out, and 
this series of demonstrations was terminated. 
But the injunction still stands. Indeed, no 
answer was filed until October f 7, 1966 . As the City 1 s 
allegations are broadly denied by defendant....,~s' answer , the 
trial will involve issues of fact as well as law. It remains 
to be seen whether this will become a historic case reaffirming 
the power and the duty of local authorities to protect the 
safety, property and welfare of innocent citizens against 
the excesses of those who take to the streets. 
The specific question is whether the conditions 
and limitations imposed on demonstrations by the Chicago 
court are consistent with the principles of Cox and similar 
cases. A related question , of even wider interest, is 
whe t her local laws may validly authorize public officials 
to impose similar limitations against all demonstrations 
without a showing of prior abuse? 
19. 
It is -ha; 1 u a believed that these questions 
will be answered affirmatively. The need for genuinely 
effective regulation becomes more evident wheri . one reflects tha· 
the use of demonstrations is not confined to appealing 
civil rights causes. 
The anti - Vietnam protest movement is an example. 
Here , I refer - not to responsible dissent and discussion 
(which must always be welcomed) - but to the extremist 
groups who have sought to undermine their own country ' s 
war effort by street demonstrations, sit-ins , attempts to 
stop troop trains, incitements to burn draft cards, and 
even by anonymous telephone calls to families of servicemen. 
J. Edgar Hoover, testifying before a Congressional 
Committee, has recently said : 
"Demonstrations protesting U. S. p'olicy 
toward Vietnam .•• have been held through-
out the United States. 
"Since February 1965, scarcely a 
day has gone by without a demonstration in 
some city. 
20. 
"The Corrnnunist party and other subversive 
groups ••. have actively supported and 
participated in (such) demonstrations •.•. "* 
A significant new development, and one which may 
surprise those who have encouraged civil disobedience in 
the streets, is the emerging participation by the "radical 
right". The marching of King Qs legions in Chicago has pro-
duced a counter force. George Lincoln Rockwell and his 
American Nazi Party have apparently decided to employ similar 
tactics. 
Rockwell recently announced a march and demonstra~ 
tion into a southside Chicago Negro neighborhood. An 
injunction prohibiting the demonstration was sought on the 
ground that it would "create a breach of the peace and 
provoke disorderly conduct". A federal judge denied the 
injunction and held that the right of free speech anQ 
assembly entitled Rockwell to march.** The judge could 
*Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, before the House Subcom= 
mittee on Appropriations, Feb. 10, 1966 , as released by 
the FBI on Sept. 22, 1966, pp. 56, et seq. 
**Chicago Tribune, Sept. 10, 1966. The news report does 
not disclose what conditions , if any, were imposed by the 
court. 
hardly have held otherwise in the face of precedents 
allowing others to demonstrate. 
If the type of demonstrations described above 
are justified for Dr. King and his Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, they are equally justified for 
George Lincoln Rockwell, for Stokley Carmichael , or 
for Robert Sheldon and their respective organiza-
21. 
tions. In the words of Mr. Justice Black, "if the streets 
of a town are open to some views, they are open to all."* 
Or putting it differently, the Bill of Rights protects 
t he unworthy as well as the worthy, and this is the way 
i t should be. 
';~ i ,: ';~ -;', ';~ 
And now a word in closing: The ultimate danger 
of the spiraling use of street demonstrations is to the 
r ule of law itself. We must , of course, allow wide scope 
to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. But these 
*~y. Louisiana , supra , dissenting opinion , at p. 580. 
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freedoms can only exist in an ordered society. There can 
be no public order if every group , pursuing its own ends 
and causes, may resort at will to coercion in t he s t ree ts , 
rather than relying upon the ballot box and democratic 
institutions. 
It is in times such as these that lawyers have a 
special responsibility. We must develop a capacit y f or 
rational detachment in the face of emotional causes , how~ 
ever appealing . We must bring about a far wider public 
understanding that once a society condones or gan i zed 
defiance of law and disregard of due process , it becomes 
increasingly difficult to protect its institut ions and to 
safeguard freedom. 
With t hese t houghts in mind , I clos e these 
remarks by suggesting that we all heed t he wa rning of a 
great liberal judge, whose concern for c ivil r ights and 
f r ee dom of dissent is excee ded only by his conce r n for our 
c ount ry . 
23. 
Mr. Justice Black has recently said: 
"Governments like ours were fonned to substitute 
the rule of law for the rule of force. Illus tra~ 
tions may be given where crowds have gathered 
together peaceably by reason of extraordinarily 
good discipline reinforced by vigilant officers. 
1 Demonstrations 9 have taken place without any 
manifestations of force at the time. But I say 
once more that the crowd moved by noble ideals 
today can become the mob ruled by hat e and 
passion and greed and violence t omorrow. I f 
we ever doubted that , we know it now . The 
peaceful songs of love can become as stirring 
and provocative as the Marseillaise did in the 
days when a noble revolution gave way to rule 
by successive mobs until chaos set in • • •• 
It (is) more necessary than ever that we s top 
and look more closely at where we are going."* 
*Brown v. Louisiana , 383 U.S. 131, 168 (1966). 
